"[Judicial]  immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.'''

                 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
                         Mr. Chief Justice Warren writing for the court.
                          Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting


___________________________________________________________________

UNITED NATIONS CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL ????
or

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

---------------------------------------------------------
J.D.,
R.L.,
E.F.
John Does,
Jane Does,
                                                       Plaintiffs
v.                                                                              PROPOSED
                                                                                CIVIL ACTION:
Justice John E. Irwin, Jr., retired, in his                        00-CV-00000
    official and individual capacities,
Justice Robert Mulligan,  in his
    official and individual capacities,
Justice Sean M. Dunphy, in his
    official and individual capacities,
All Other Justices Presently of the
    Probate and Family Court Department
    of the Trial Court of Massachusetts, in
    their official and individual capacities
Other Justices retired after 28 February
    1997 from the  Probate and Family
    Court Department of the Trial Court of
    Massachusetts, in their official and
    individual capacities,
                                                   Defendants
---------------------------------------------------------

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

NATURE OF THE CASE

JURISDICTION
1. Jurisdiction of this court arises under Article III § 2, for violations of the United States Constitution, and  28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1343(a), and 1367(a); 42 U.S.C. secs. 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988; and 18 U.S.C. §1961-- 1968, for violations of certain protections guaranteed to him by the First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution, .

2. Jurisdiction of this court for the pendent claims is authorized by F.R.Civ.P. 18(a), and arises under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
 

PARTIES
3.  Plaintiff J.D. is a natural person who at all relevant times of thie complaint, resided at ___, Middlesex County, Massachusetts, United States of America, and was a party seeking custody in an action which was being prosecuted in the Middlesex  Probate & Family Court of the Trial Court of Massacusetts and in which the court appointed a guardian ad litem.

4.  Plaintiff R.L. is a natural person who at all relevant times of thie complaint, resided at ___, Middlesex County, Massachusetts, United States of America, and was a party seeking visitation in an action which was being prosecuted in the Middlesex Probate & Family Courts of the Trial Court of Massacusetts and in which the court appointed a guardian ad litem.

5.  Plaintiff E.F. is a natural person who at all relevant times of thie complaint, resided at ___, Suffolk and Hampshire Counties, Massachusetts, United States of America, and was a party seeking custody in an action which was being prosecuted in the Suffolk Probate & Family Court of the Trial Court of Massacusetts and in which the court appointed a guardian ad litem..

6.  Plaintiffs John Does are natural persons who at all relevant times of this complaint, resided in Massachusetts, United States of America, and were parties to actions seeking custody or visitation in an action which was being prosecuted in the Suffolk Probate & Family Court of the Trial Court of Massacusetts and in which the court appointed a guardian ad litem.

7.  Plaintiffs Jane Does are natural persons who at all relevant times of this complaint, resided in Massachusetts, United States of America, and were parties to actions seeking custody or visitation in actions which were being prosecuted in the Suffolk Probate & Family Court of the Trial Court of Massacusetts and in which the court appointed a guardian ad litem.

8.  Defendant John J. Irwin, Jr.,  who is now retired, was, at all times relevant to this complaint, Chief Justice of Administration and Management of the Trial Court of Massachusetts,

<>9.   Defendant Robert Mulligan was at all times relevant to this complaint a sitting Justice of the Probate and Family Court, and was a successor Chief Justice of Administration and Management of the Trial Court of Massachusetts,

10. .Defendant Sean Dunphy, who is now retired, was appointed to serve as  Probate and Family Court Department of the Trial Court of Massachusetts,

. . .

xx.  All defendants are being sued in their official and individual capacties.
.

Count One: Civil RICO 

xx, incorporated by reference

xx.  Defendants agreed to commit crimes.

xx.  Defendants planned, prepared, initiated, and waged wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of civil rights, human rights, the GAL statute, equal protection, due process, agreements, and assurances.
 

Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Common-Law Cnspiracy

xx, incorporated by reference

xx.  Defendants agreed to commit crimes.
 

Count Three: Conspiracy to Wage Aggressive War

<>xx, incorporated by reference.

xx.   <>Defendants agreed to conspire to----- .

<>

~~ NOTE ~~

In the Nuremburg Trials, the "common plan or conspiracy" charge was designed to get around the problem of how to deal with crimes committed before the war. The defendants charged under Count One were accused of agreeing to commit crimes.  The concept of conspiracy was not a part of continental law, and remained controversial throughout the trial.

Some historians have argued that this count caused prosecutors to
over-emphasize the coherence of Nazi policymaking. It also gave the defense an additional reason to emphasize the confused Nazi command structure and
allowed the defendants to buttress their contentions of ignorance of the
regime's brutality.

Count Four: Conspiracy to Commit Crimes Against Humanity

xx, incorporated by reference

xx.  Defendants agreed to commit crimes against humanity.

xx.  Defendants planned, prepared, initiated, and waged wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of civil rights, human rights, the GAL statute, equal protection, due process, agreements, and assurances.

This charge created problems for the prosecutors. Although Hitler had clearly waged an aggressive war, beginning with the invasion of Poland in 1939,

Count Two
Count Two was based on allegations that the Germans had violated international agreements such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.  Signatories to that agreement had renounced war as an instrument of national policy (as opposed, say, to defensive war), but the pact did not define "aggressive war" and did not spell out the penalties for its violation.

(The Anschluss and the invasion of Czechoslovakia were not held to be
aggressive wars because Hitler had manipulated the political situation in
each nation in order to avoid an invasion.)

The Soviet Union also had broken the Kellogg-Briand Pact by invading
Finland, Poland and the Baltics, and had schemed with Hitler to sign the
Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1939 (which secretly divided Poland).

Robert Jackson, the chief U.S. prosecutor, wanted the International Military Tribunal to create new international law that would outlaw aggressive war Clearly, the premise that it is possible to outlaw war is a questionable one.

Count Three: War Crimes
The Russian and French prosecutors presented evidence on atrocities
committed in the East and West, respectively.

Count Three was intended to deal with acts that violated traditional
concepts of the law of war -- e.g. the use of slave labor; bombing civilian
populations; the Reprisal Order (signed by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, a
defendant, this order required that 50 Soviet soldiers be shot for every
German killed by partisans); the Commando Order (issued by Keitel, it
ordered that downed Allied airmen be shot rather than taken captive).

The violations of international law under Count Three were more clearly
rooted in precedent than the other counts.

International laws of war had developed during the 18th and 19th centuries. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 dealt with the conduct of war by
outlawing certain types of weapons (dum-dum bullets, poison gas) and
outlining treatment of POWs and civilians. The Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906 dealt with treatment of the sick and wounded. (After 1929, the treatment of POWs was promulgated by the Geneva Convention.)   Naval law
developed separately and originally dealt with problems of piracy, rescue,
false flags and the like.

War crimes were defined under the London Charter (the document drafted by
the Allies before the trial began) as "murder, ill treatment or deportation
to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners-of-war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity."

Count Four: Crimes Against Humanity
The Russians and the French again divided responsibility along East-West
lines.

Count Four was applied to defendants responsible for the death camps,
concentration camps and killing rampages in the East.

Initially, crimes against humanity were understood to be crimes committed by a government against its own people, and there was some question as to
whether the concept could be applied internationally. Their inclusion in
the London Charter was a novel extension of the concept.

The London Charter defined these crimes as "murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated."
 

Wherefore plaintiff prays this Court issue equitable relief as follows:

1. Issue injunctive relief commanding defendant to . . .
2. Issue declaratory relief as this Court deems appropriate and just.
3. Issue other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just.
4. Award plaintiffs their costs of litigation.

                                        PLAINTIFFS,
                                        By their attorney,
The future 20XX                 Barbara C.Johnson
                                        Barbara C. Johnson, Esq.
                                        6 Appletree Lane
                                        Andover, MA 01810-4102
                                        978-474-0833